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SUSPENSIONS AND EXPULSIONS UNDER
THE EDUCATION FOR ALL
HANDICAPPED CHILDREN ACT:
VICTORY FOR HANDICAPPED
CHILDREN OR DEFEAT FOR
SCHOOL OFFICIALS?
I. INTRODUCTION
Mainstreaming handicapped children 1 in public schools creates new
demands and expectations on regular classroom personnel.2 Schools
must comply with statutory procedural requirements, identify handi-
capping conditions, provide adequate individualized programs, and su-
pervise and discipline handicapped children.3 School officials have
encountered particular uncertainty in determining how to discipline
disruptive handicapped children.4 Under the Education for All Handi-
capped Children Act (EAHCA), disabled students are entitled to pro-
1. Handicapped "children" are those between the ages of 3 and 21 who require
special education and related services because they fall within the definition of handi-
capped. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1) (1976). See infra note 23 for a definition of "handi-
capped." This Note uses the terms "handicapped" and "disabled" interchangeably. As
of December 1982, 4.298 million children were identified as receiving special education
and related services under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act. See Re-
cent Federal Legislation Affecting Disabled Persons, 20 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1173
(1987).
2. Rothstein, Accountability For Professional Misconduct in Providing Education to
Handicapped Children, 14 J. LAW & EDUC. 349 (1985).
3. Ia at 350. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-61 (1976).
4. Rothstein, supra note 2, at 371.
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cedural protections not offered to their nondisabled peers.5 The Act
ensures that all disabled children receive a free appropriate education
and applies whenever schools try to hinder a disabled child's access to
education.6 Suspensions, expulsions, and transfers to more controlled
environments remove the student from his current course of study and,
in effect, change his placement.7 Thus, school officials cannot suspend
or expel disruptive disabled students in the same manner as disruptive
nondisabled students.
Expulsion, which results in total loss of educational services,' is the
most severe sanction school administrators may impose on disruptive
students. In Honig v. Doe & Smith, the Supreme Court prohibited
schools from expelling or indefinitely suspending disabled children for
dangerous or disruptive behavior resulting from their handicap.9 Sup-
porters of disabled persons' rights applauded the decision as a victory
for the handicapped. School officials, however, advocate the use of one
5. See Doe v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470, 1480 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Honig v.
Doe & Smith, 108 S. Ct. 592 (1988) (case addressing the clash between procedural
rights of handicapped children and authority traditionally accorded public school
officials).
6. Comment, The Rights of Handicapped Students in Disciplinary Proceedings by
Public SchoolAuthorities, 53 U. COLO. L. REv. 367, 372 (1981). Legislation enacted to
protect handicapped children includes the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-94
(1973) and the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1401-61
(1976). This legislation resulted from congressional findings that a large number of
handicapped children failed to receive an adequate education, either because their
handicaps went undetected or because of a lack of sufficient services once public schools
did detect such handicaps. The widespread practice of relegating handicapped children
to private institutions or segregating them in special classes evoked great congressional
concern. Congress recognized that countless handicapped children did not receive a
meaningful public education simply because states lacked the funds and initiative to
address the special problems involved in teaching such children. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(b)
(1976). See infra notes 46-55 and accompanying text (discussing the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act's approach to program changes).
7. Comment, supra note 6, at 370. A suspension constitutes a temporary removal,
while an expulsion is a permanent removal from the classroom. Both interrupt the
child's school work. Id Children have both liberty and property interests in education.
Thus, their right to attend school may be compromised only with good reason. Chil-
dren's educational and individual rights are balanced against the school authorities'
duty to provide all students with a safe school environment that is conducive to learn-
ing. Id. See infra note 85 (discussing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975), which
held that education is a property interest protected by the due process clause).
8. Removal from school terminates the student's access to the resources of public
education.
9. 108 S. Ct. 592 (1988). See infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of Honig.
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disciplinary system for all children; otherwise, disabled children would
be immune from discipline.1° Anticipating this criticism, the Court
noted that Congress did not leave school officials powerless to disci-
pline handicapped students. Schools could use temporary suspensions
and interim placements, subject to parental approval.1
This Note examines the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act, which Congress enacted to ensure that every handicapped child
receives a free, appropriate public education. Sections II and III dis-
cuss the legislative history and the basic provisions of EAHCA. Sec-
tion IV examines conflicts between EAHCA and school disciplinary
measures. Sections V and VI discuss why disabled children and their
parents oppose suspensions and expulsions and why school officials ad-
vocate the use of such measures. This Note concludes by discussing
the Supreme Court's narrowing of schools' traditional authority and
suggesting alternative disciplinary measures.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 197512 guaran-
tees handicapped children specific rights. It is the primary source of
federal funding to state agencies that provide special educational and
other services for disabled children. 3 This legislation reflects an in-
10. See infra notes 102-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of arguments
favoring suspensions and expulsions.
11. Honig, 108 S. Ct. at 604. The procedural protections of the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act are invoked whenever school officials act to hinder a handi-
capped child's access to education. See infra note 30 (listing procedural protections
under EAHCA).
12. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 775 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1400-61 (1976)).
13. EAHCA provides federal grants to state education departments. These depart-
ments then channel most of the funds to local agencies that provide direct services to
handicapped children. Before a state can qualify for federal funds, it must adopt a
policy assuring all handicapped children an appropriate public education in the least
restrictive environment. Compliance is assured by provisions that permit the withhold-
ing of funds upon a determination that a state or local agency has failed to satisfy
EAHCA's requirements. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2)(A) (1976).
Congress did not intend EAHCA to provide all funding for educating handicapped
children. Rather, it intended the Act to relieve part of the burden of the high cost of
such education. See L. ROTHSTEIN, RIGHTS OF PHYSICALLY HANDICAPPED PERSONS
§ 2.12 (1984). On average, educating a handicapped child costs twice as much as edu-
cating a nonhandicapped child. Id. See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984) (Con-
gress enacted EAHCA to remedy the inadequacy of educational services provided for
the nation's handicapped children).
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creased awareness of disabled children's educational needs 14 and re-
sults from the discovery that more than half the nation's handicapped
children did not receive an adequate education.'s Congress also
promulgated EAHCA in response to Mills v. Board of Education of the
District of Columbia 16 and Pennsylvania Association of Retarded Chil-
dren v. Commonwealth,17 two landmark decisions establishing the con-
stitutional right of handicapped children to a publicly funded
education. These cases provided the catalyst for the development of
comprehensive state and local educational programs for disabled
children.18
Legislation enacted prior to EAHCA prohibits the discrimination of
disabled persons in federally funded programs or activities. 9 The Re-
14. H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975). The lack of progress under
earlier statutes greatly dissatisfied Congress. Evidence of this is shown in the House
Report, which emphasized the problems of exclusion and misplacement of handicapped
children. Senator Williams, one of the principal sponsors of EAHCA, urged the Act's
passage, stating, "[W]hile much progress has been made in the past few years, we can
take no solace in that progress until all handicapped children are, in fact, receiving an
education." 121 Cong. Rec. 19,486 (1975).
15. 121 Cong. Rec. 19,502 (1975). Senator Javitz stated that "all too often, we have
denied our handicapped citizens the opportunity to receive an adequate education." Id.
at 19,494. Senator Cranston noted that millions of handicapped children are largely
excluded from educational opportunities provided to other children and are denied ac-
cess to public schools due to a lack of trained personnel. Id. at 19,502.
16. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
17. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) and 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
18. Both cases are considered to be prominent contributions to Congress' enactment
of EAHCA. In PARC, plaintiffs, retarded children, alleged that Pennsylvania's com-
pulsory education statute, which excluded them from public education and training,
violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
The children were considered ineducable because they could not benefit from a public
education. Although a consent decree resolved the case, the court enjoined the state
from denying any mentally retarded child access to a free public program of education
and training. 334 F. Supp. at 1258.
The Mills decision simply embodied what the parties had agreed to in PARC a year
earlier. The court held that the state's denial of public education to handicapped chil-
dren constituted a violation of due process. Thus, the state could not exclude handi-
capped children from public education unless it gave them an adequate and immediate
alternative education, as well as due process protections. The decision applied to all
children excluded from school because of mental, behavioral, emotional, or physical
handicaps. 348 F. Supp. at 878.
Because the legislative reports discuss PARC and Mills at length, the EAHCA draft-
ers were clearly guided by the principles these cases established. See Board of Educ. of
the Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192-93 (1984).
19. See Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 701 (1978)). Section 504 specifically provides: "No otherwise qualified handicapped
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habilitation Act requires federally funded educational agencies to pro-
vide handicapped children with an education in a regular classroom or
to construct an appropriate program of free public education.2 ° Sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act defines a handicapped individual as
any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which sub-
stantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii)
has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such
an impairment.2 Because virtually all states receive federal funds for
educational purposes, most state educational agencies are subject to the
Act.2
2
Although both section 504 and EAHCA grant the federal govern-
ment the authority to act for the protection of the handicapped, they
differ in several respects. First, EAHCA defines handicapped children
as those who require special education and related services because
they are learning disabled, mentally retarded, emotionally disturbed, or
have specified physical handicaps.23 EAHCA provides federal funding
to states that guarantee every handicapped student a "free appropriate
public education" (FAPE)24 by implementing its substantive and pro-
individual in the U.S.... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving federal financial assistance .. " 29 U.S.C. § 794.
20. Phipps v. New Hanover County Bd. of Educ., 551 F. Supp. 732 (E.D.N.C.
1982).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 706(6) (1973). See L. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 13, at 22.
22. The 1973 Act's predecessor sought to provide rehabilitation services for the pur-
pose of employability. Section 504, added in 1973, extended the Act's applicability to
other areas of life by prohibiting any discrimination by recipients of federal funds. L.
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 13, at 80.
23. 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (1976) defines handicapped children as "mentally retarded,
hard of hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually handicapped, seriously emotionally dis-
turbed, orthopedically impaired, or other health impaired children, or children with
specific learning disabilities, who by reason thereof require special education and related
services,"
24. The stated purpose of EAHCA is:
to assure that all handicapped children have available them... a free, appropriate
public education which emphasizes special education and related services desig-
nated to meet their unique needs, to assure that the rights of handicapped children
and their parents or guardians are protected, to assist States and localities to pro-
vide for education of all handicapped children, and to assess the effectiveness of
efforts to handicapped children.
20 U.S.C. § 1414(c) (1976).
A free appropriate public education (FAPE) is defined as: "special education and re-
lated services which (A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision
and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the standards of the State educational
1989]
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cedural requirements.25 While section 504 applies to all federally
funded programs, EAHCA only applies to states and their political
subdivisions that receive federal grants for education.
26
By enacting EAHCA, Congress demonstrated a clear federal com-
mitment to educating all handicapped children. 27 The Act's legislative
history reveals that Congress, intending to guarantee more than just
agency, (C) include an appropriate ... education in the State involved, and (D) are
provided in conformity with the individualized education program." 20 U.S.C.
§ 1401(18) (1976). "Special education" means cost-free instruction which meets the
unique needs of the child. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(16) (1976). "Related services" include
transportation and other various support services enabling the child to benefit from
special education. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1976).
25. The means by which a state must provide free appropriate public education are
enumerated in the Act and its regulations. See 34 C.F.R. § 300 (1987). A state must:
(a) identify, locate and evaluate all handicapped children in the state in need of special
education, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(c) (1976), 34 C.F.R. § 300.128(a)(1) (1987); (b) establish
and implement a program of appropriate education in the least restrictive placement, 20
U.S.C. § 1415 (1976), 34 C.F.R. § 300.505-.556 (1987); (c) establish and implement a
system of due process procedures within certain minimum guidelines to protect the
rights of parents, 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1976), 34 C.F.R. § 300.500-.514 (1987); (d) estab-
lish and implement a system of personnel development, 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(3) (1976),
34 C.F.R. § 300.380-.387 (1987); (e) provide an annual program plan describing these
requirements, 20 U.S.C. § 1412-13 (1976), 34 C.F.R. § 300.110-.151 (1987).
For a discussion of the substantive and procedural rights, see L. ROTHSTEIN, supra
note 13, at § 2.12.
26. See generally Schoenfeld, Civil Rights for the Handicapped Under the Constitu-
tion and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 49 U. CIN. L. REV. 580 (1980). The
Rehabilitation Act became the first comprehensive federal law involving handicapped
persons' rights. Section 504 applies only to programs that receive federal financial
assistance and only to those states that elect to accept federal funding. The section
applies to all state programs or activities that receive or benefit from federal assistance
and all entities which receive funds indirectly through another recipient. Thus local
school districts are also subject to its requirements. L. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 13, at
21.
27. 121 Cong. Rec. 19,485 (1975) (statement of Sen. Williams).
Congress found that the public school system excluded approximately eight million
handicapped children in the United States and that more than half of all handicapped
children received an inadequate education. Many children remained either completely
excluded from any form of public education or virtually ignored in classrooms designed
for their nonhandicapped peers. Id
EAHCA requires states to extend educational services first to children denied educa-
tion and then to those receiving an inadequate education. Upon examining the express
statutory findings and priorities, coupled with the extensive procedural requirements
and the definition of free appropriate public education, "the face of the statute evinces a
congressional intent to bring previously excluded handicapped children into the public
education systems of the states." Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Central
School Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 189 (1982).
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equal educational access for handicapped children, sought full educa-
tional opportunities through the cooperative efforts of all levels of gov-
ernment. 2s Congress found that by providing handicapped children
with the education necessary to become productive citizens,29 states
would save the costs of placing the handicapped in state institutions.
Because Congress recognized that handicapped children need special
programs, EAHCA requires states to place them in programs suitable
to their individual abilities.3" These placement procedures, however,
cause problems when educators try to discipline a handicapped stu-
28. 121 Cong. Rec. 19,478 (1975) (statement of Sen. Randolf). The increased
awareness of the educational needs of handicapped children and the implications of
Mills and PARC illustrate the need for expanded federal involvement if progress is de-
sired in this area. Id.
29. 121 Cong. Rec. at 19,485 (1975) (statement of Sen. Williams). Congress has a
duty to protect basic rights of handicapped children. By providing appropriate educa-
tional services, handicapped children can become contributing members of society. Id.
at 19,494. Senator Humphrey stated that almost three million handicapped children,
while in school, receive none of the special services they require to make education a
meaningful experience. Id. at 19,504. See S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9
(1975). Society suffers when a handicapped child is deprived of educational opportu-
nity. Public agencies and taxpayers will spend billions of dollars during handicapped
individuals' lifetimes to maintain them. With proper educational services, many handi-
capped persons could become productive citizens who contribute to society. Others
could increase their independence and reduce their societal dependence. Too often
handicapped children are viewed as an extra burden because of the limited availability
and high cost of private schooling. Such children are often confined to their homes or
sent to institutions. 121 Cong. Rec. at 19,505. See infra notes 89-96 and accompanying
text for a discussion of injuries suffered from loss of education. See also Comment,
Suspension and Expulsion of Handicapped Children: An Overview in Light of Doe v.
Maher, 14 W. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 341 (1986).
30. The minimal procedural safeguards a state or local educational agency is re-
quired to establish and maintain in order to receive federal funding are enumerated in
§ 1415 of EAHCA. The procedures include: (a) opportunity for the parents of handi-
capped children to examine all relevant records relating to the child's education and
placement, § 1415(b)(1)(A); (b) written notice to the parents prior to a change in place-
ment, § 1415(b)(1)(C); (c) an opportunity for parents to initiate an impartial due pro-
cess hearing with respect to placement or evaluation, § 1415(b)(1)(E); (d) impartial
review by state educational agency if the hearing is conducted by a local agency,
§ 1415(c); (e) parents who are dissatisfied with decisions or findings of state review may
bring a civil action in federal district court, § 1415(e)(l)-(4).
EAHCA establishes procedural safeguards that guarantee parents both an opportu-
nity for meaningful input into all decisions affecting their child's education and the right
to seek review of any decision they deem inappropriate. Honig v. Doe & Smith, 108 S.
Ct. 592 (1988). See also Burger v. Murray County School Dist., 612 F. Supp. 434 (N.D.
Ga. 1984) (handicapped child is guaranteed the right to have placement changes en-
acted pursuant to specified procedures).
The FAPE is tailored to the unique needs of the child through an individualized
1989]
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dent, thus changing his program.31
III. ATTRIBUTES OF EAHCA
The main feature of EAHCA is the individualized educational pro-
gram (IEP).32 The IEP is a comprehensive statement of the handi-
capped child's educational needs and goals and the specially designed
instruction and related services to meet them.3 3 The child's teacher, a
school official qualified in special education, the parents or guardian,
and the child himself help develop the IEP.34 Congress emphasized
education program (IEP). See infra notes 41-48 for a discussion of EAHCA's proce-
dural safeguards.
In its first interpretation of EAHCA, the Supreme Court held that EAHCA did not
require the state to maximize each child's potential or to ensure that a handicapped
child receive the best educational program. Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson
Central School Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). The Court found that Congress
enacted EAHCA to open public education to handicapped children on appropriate
terms rather than to guarantee them any particular level of education. Id. at 192. Con-
gress only intended EAHCA to provide free access to a "basic floor of opportunity" for
each child. Id The Court defined FAPE as being less than the best education possible
but more than the same education for nonhandicapped students. Id.
See also Taylor By Holbrook v. Board of Educ., 649 F. Supp. 1253, 1258 (N.D.N.Y.
1986) (defendants under no obligation to place a student in the setting that will maxi-
mize his potential, although an obligation exists to ensure he receives, at minimum, an
appropriate education).
31. See infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of school officials
changing placement by suspension or expulsion.
32. Burlington School Community v. Massachusetts Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359,
368 (1985). The IEP is a written document provided to handicapped children
containing:
(A) a statement of the present levels of educational performance of such child; (B)
a statement of annual goals, including short-term instructional objectives; (C) a
statement of the specific educational services to be provided to such child, and the
extent to which such child will be able to participate in regular educational pro-
grams; (D) the projected date for initiation and anticipated duration of such serv-
ices; and (E) appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures and
schedules for determining, on at least an annual basis, whether instructional objec-
tives are being achieved.
20 U.S.C. § 1401 (1976).
See Tatro v. State of Texas, 703 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1983) (IEP described as educa-
tional blueprint specifying how to teach, set goals, and measure progress).
33. Burlington, 476 U.S. at 368. See Wegner, Variations on a Theme - The Con-
cept of Opportunity and Programing Decisions under the EAHCA of 1975, 48 J. LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 169 (1985).
34. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(7) (1976). Local or regional educational agencies must review,
and where appropriate revise, each child's IEP at least annually. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5)
(1976).
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the importance of parental participation in developing and assessing
the IEP. Congress incorporated procedural safeguards to ensure pa-
rental input, including the right to seek review of any decisions the
parents think are inappropriate.
A fundamental EAHCA provision states that handicapped students,
to the greatest extent possible, must be educated with nonhandicapped
students.36 This concept of mainstreaming in the regular classroom is
also known as placing the student in the least restrictive environment
(LRE).37 Exclusion from the regular classroom is the most restrictive
35. Because of the importance of parental participation in the IEP process, the reg-
ulations promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services provide de-
tailed assurances for the maximization of their involvement. See L. ROTHSTEIN, supra
note 13, at § 2.16. Officials must give parents adequate notice to participate and must
schedule meetings at mutually convenient times. 34 C.F.R. § 300.345(d) (1987). Par-
ents are allowed to: examine all relevant records with respect to the identification, eval-
uation, and educational placement of the child; obtain an independent educational
evaluation; receive notice of any decision to initiate or change the identification, evalua-
tion or educational placement; present complaints with respect to the above; receive an
impartial due process hearing. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (1976).
36. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (1976), 34 C.F.R. § 300.550-.556 (1987). See Comment,
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act The Benefits and Burdens of Main-
streaming Capable Handicapped Children, 38 MERCER L. REV. 903 (1987). Congress
did not intend EAHCA to require placement of all handicapped children in regular
classrooms, but to provide the necessary support services in the regular classroom.
Mainstreaming allows handicapped children's concurrent education with nonhandicap-
ped children. Congress recognized that regular classrooms would not always suit the
educational needs of many handicapped children.
Section 1412(5) states, "The nature of severity of the handicap [may be] such that
education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be
achieved satisfactorily. EAHCA, therefore, provides for educating some handicapped
children in separate classes or institutional settings." See 34 C.F.R. § 300.553 comment
(1987) (handicapped children must receive nonacademic services in as integrated a set-
ting as possible); 34 C.F.R. § 300.554 comment (1987) (each state educational agency
must insure that each applicable state agency and institution implement the required
education of handicapped children with nonhandicapped children); Burger v. Murray
County School Dist., 612 F. Supp. 434, 436 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (an important purpose
behind EAHCA is to foster the education of handicapped children in environments
where they will have the opportunity to learn alongside nonhandicapped children);
Rothstein, supra note 2, at 349.
37. L. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 13, at § 2.15. Mainstreaming's ultimate goal is to
move children into the mainstream of education, the regular classroom. See also
Turnbull, The Least Restrictive Environment for Handicapped Children: Who Really
Wants It, 16 FAM. L.Q. 161 (1982); Miller & Miller, The Handicapped Child's Civil
Rights as it Relates to the "Least Restrictive Environment" and Appropriate Mainstream-
ing, 54 IND. L.J. 1 (1978).
To implement the right of a handicapped child to an education in the LRE, schools
must provide a continuum of alternative placements. These alternatives include instruc-
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educational placement.38 The handicapped child should receive the
placement that best enables him to meet IEP goals.39 Mainstreaming
seeks to avoid the stigma of exclusion from the regular classroom while
providing the educational benefits of a nonhandicapped school
situation.4'
EAHCA's regulations41 state that no regular public school may
tion in regular classes, special classes, private schools, the home, and other institutions.
By providing a range of placements, EAHCA attempts to insure that each child receives
an education responsive to his or her individual needs while maximizing the opportu-
nity to learn with nonhandicapped peers. Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235, 1242 (D.
Conn. 1978).
38. Turnbull, supra note 37, at 195. Because expulsion is the most harmful effect
and most restrictive placement, it is not an option. Id. School officials often use expul-
sion as a means of removing offending students. This gives the student time to reflect on
his behavior and punishes him by segregating him from his classmates. Comment,
supra note 6, at 377.
39. 45 C.F.R. § 84.34 (1977). The LRE constitutes an attempt to protect handi-
capped children from harmful stereotypes. Turnbull, supra note 37, at 168.
40. The LRE promotes appropriate education by creating an impetus toward inte-
gration of handicapped children with "regular education" where their education is en-
hanced. Turnbull, supra note 37, at 169. Obvious advantages inhere to any child
permitted to learn in a stable environment. This advantage may mean even more to the
handicapped child. Burger, 612 F. Supp. at 437. See L. Rothstein, supra note 13, at
§ 2.15.
41. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) released detailed regula-
tions to facilitate implementation of EAHCA and to provide clear-cut guidelines for
many areas of special education. 34 C.F.R. § 300.1-.754 (1987). EAHCA's purpose is:
(a) to insure that all handicapped children have available to them a free appropri-
ate public education which includes special education and related services to meet
their unique needs; (b) to insure that the rights of handicapped children and their
parents are protected; (c) to assist States and localities to provide for the education
of all handicapped children; and (d) to assess and insure the effectiveness of efforts
to educate children.
34 C.F.R. § 300.1 (1987). Many of the procedural safeguards found in EAHCA's regu-
lations are also found in the regulations which implement § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act. See 45 C.F.R. § 84 (1987); see also 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.500-.589 (1987). See Doe v.
Maher, 793 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'd sub nom Honig v. Doe and Smith, 108 S.
Ct. 592 (1988) (procedures ensure parental involvement in administrative process and
enable parents to challenge agency actions they believe inappropriate or inadequate).
Handicapped children have the right to remain in their present placement until the
resolution of any special education complaint. 34 C.F.R. § 300.513 (1987). During the
pendency of any administrative or judicial proceeding regarding a complaint, unless the
public agency and the parents of the child agree otherwise, the child involved in the
complaint must remain in his or her present educational placement. See Tilton, By
Richardo v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 705 F.2d 800 (6th Cir. 1983) (proposed
change in placement has been recognized as type of fundamental change triggering
§ 1415 requirements).
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deny an education to a handicapped child capable of learning in that
setting.42  As a response to self-contained special education pro-
grams, 43 the LRE principle prevents the exclusion of handicapped chil-
dren from meaningful educational opportunities in a classroom with
nonhandicapped students.44 It allows placement in special classes or
separate schools only if the nature of the child's handicap is such that
schools cannot educate him satisfactorily in regular classes, even with
the use of supplementary aids and services.45
EAHCA and its regulations provide detailed due process proce-
dures-encompassing identification, evaluation, placement, and change
in placement-to ensure that all handicapped children receive appro-
priate education.46 Although EAHCA does not explicitly address the
42. 34 C.F.R. § 300.554 comment (1987).
43. Turnbull, supra note 37, at 162.
44. See Mills v. Board of Educ. of the Dist. of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.C.
Cir. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n of Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 343 F. Supp.
279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). The Mills decision demonstrates the extent to which schools could
use disciplinary measures to bar children from the classroom. School officials in Mills
classified four of the seven plaintiffs as "behavioral problems" and excluded them from
classes without providing any alternative education or notification to their parents. 348
F. Supp. at 869-70. The district court found that this practice, not limited to these
plaintiffs, affected an estimated 12,000 to 18,000 disabled students. In light of these
statistics, the court enjoined future exclusions, suspensions, or expulsions on discipli-
nary grounds. Id. at 880.
45. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(4) (1976), 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.550 (1987). Despite the prefer-
ence for mainstreaming handicapped children, Congress recognized that regular class-
rooms would not adequately serve the education of all handicapped children. 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.551 (1987) requires educational agencies to develop a "continuum of alternative
placements." Id. The ultimate goal is to keep handicapped children in the regular
classroom; they should only be moved into more restrictive placements if absolutely
necessary. See also Norris v. Massachusetts Dep't of Educ,, 529 F. Supp. 759 (D. Mass.
1981); Johnston v. Ann Arbor Pub. School, 569 F. Supp. 1502 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
The education of nonhandicapped children is also a factor in determining the appro-
priateness of regular class placement. The presence of handicapped students might
lessen the quality of the education offered to the other students by increasing the de-
mands of the teacher. Note, Enforcing the Right to an "Appropriate Education", 92
HARv. L. REv. 1103, 1123 (1979).
46. Rothstein, supra note 2, at 355. See also L. ROTHTEIN, supra note 13, at
§ 2.23; 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(C) (1976); 34 C.F.R. § 300.530-.543 (1987). Many of
EAHCA's due process procedures are similar to those required in Mills. EAHCA also
confers to handicapped students an enforceable substantive right to public education in
participating states. Honig, 108 S. Ct. at 614. Congress incorporated an elaborate set of
"procedural safeguards" to ensure the full participation of the parents and the proper
resolution of substantive disagreements. Burlington School Community v. Massachu-
setts Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 368 (1985). See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(C) (1976); 34
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discipline of handicapped students,47 section 1415 (e)(3), the "stay
put" provision, prohibits state and local school authorities from unilat-
erally excluding disabled children from the classroom.48 The section
states that during the pendency of any proceedings initiated under
EAHCA, the child shall remain in the current educational placement
unless the parents or agency agrees to a change.49 Thus, section
1415(e)(3) preserves the status quo pending resolution of administra-
tive and judicial proceedings.50
IV. CONFLICTS BETWEEN EAHCA AND
DISCIPLINARY MEASURES
Conflicts arise between EAHCA procedures and school disciplinary
systems. 1 EAHCA prohibits disciplinary measures which effectively
C.F.R. § 300.504(a)(1),(2) (1987); L. ROTHmsTEiN, supra note 13, at § 2.24 (on place-
ment, identification, and evaluation).
47. Doe v. Koger, 480 F. Supp. 225, 228 (N.D. Ind. 1979). See Sindelar, Suspen-
sions and Expulsions of Handicapped Students: The Evolving Case Law, 12 SCHOOL L.
BULL. 1 (1981). Exclusion of handicapped children may violate certain substantive
rights and procedural safeguards created by EAHCA and the Rehabilitation Act. The
court in Doe v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir.), aff'd sub nom. Honig v. Doe and
Smith, 108 S. Ct. 592 (1988), agreed that EAHCA prohibits the expulsion of a handi-
capped student for misbehavior that is a manifestation of his handicap. This proscrip-
tion, although nowhere directly stated in EAHCA, may be inferred from the Act's
legislative history, purpose, terms, and accompanying regulations. Id. at 1481. See S-1
v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1030 (1981); Kaelin
v. Grubbs, 682 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1982); Doe v. Koger, 480 F. Supp. 225 (N.D. Ind.
1979).
48. Doe, 480 F. Supp. at 228. In 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1976), Congress set out the
procedures by which schools receiving funds can change the placement of handicapped
children. As HHS interpreted EAHCA, schools could not expel students whose handi-
cap caused disruptive behavior. See Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Conn.
1978). An expulsion not only changes a student's placement, but also restricts the avail-
ability of alternative placements. Expulsion may exclude a child from a placement that
is appropriate for academic and social development. Thus, the use of expulsion pro-
ceedings for changing a disruptive handicapped child's placement contravenes the pro-
cedures of EAHCA. Id. at 1243.
See Honig, 108 S. Ct. at 604. As the legislative history demonstrates, Congress
sought to remedy schools' unilateral exclusion of disabled children. Congress intended
§ 1415(e)(3) to prevent school officials from removing a child from the regular public
school classroom over parental objections, pending completion of review proceedings.
Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369.
49. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3) (1976).
50. Doe v. Brookline School Community, 722 F.2d 910, 915 (1st Cir. 1983).
51. Although EAHCA does not specifically address expulsions and suspensions, it
does establish certain procedures for changing a child's placement. A school would
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change a child's placement. 2 Difficulties arise when educators remove
disruptive handicapped children from their current course of study.
IEPs cannot be altered without following EAHCA's placement proce-
dures. 3 If the suspension is longer than a few days, it constitutes an
unlawful change in the child's placement. 4 When parents and school
officials decide not to design a new IEP, they must proceed with a due
contravene these procedures if it expelled or indefinitely suspended a handicapped child
as a disciplinary measure. Schools may not deprive a handicapped child of an appropri-
ate education as a result of handicap-related conduct. Further, schools must change a
placement through EAHCA's procedural mechanisms. A disabled student may invoke
EAHCA's protections in an expulsion proceeding. Change in placement proceedings
include evaluation by a specialized team, written notice to the child's parents, opportu-
nity to present complaints to the school board, the right to a hearing, and an appeal of
the decision. See Schoof, The Application of P.L 94-142 to the Suspension and Expul-
sion of Handicapped Children, 24 ARIz. L. REv. 685, 693 (1982).
Expulsion procedures for regular students do not impose these requirements and
therefore do not apply to handicapped children. Rothstein, supra note 2, at 350. There
are two types of discipline. One, primarily in the classroom, is within the teacher's
discretion. The other, imposed by administrators, involves suspensions and expulsions.
Id.
52. See, e.g., Honig v. Doe & Smith, 108 S. Ct. 592 (1988); Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F.
Supp. 1235 (D. Conn. 1978); Kaelin v. Grubbs, 682 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1982); S-1 v.
Turlington, 635 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1030 (1981); Sherry v.
New York State Educ. Dep't, 479 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D.N.Y. 1979); Doe v. Koger, 480
F. Supp. 225 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
53. Comment, supra note 6, at 369.
54. Id at 395-97. See Sherry, 479 F. Supp. at 1337 (indefinite suspension consti-
tutes a significant change in the student's educational placement within the meaning of
§ 1415); Stuart, 443 F. Supp. at 1242-43. In Stuart, plaintiff, a handicapped child
within the meaning of EAHCA, argued that suspension and expulsion from her high
school denied her the right to an adequate public education. The court found that
expulsion prior to resolution of her special education complaint would violate
§ 1415(eX3). The right to remain in her current placement, however, directly conflicted
with her high school's disciplinary process. An expulsion during the pendency of her
special education complaint would constitute a change in placement in contravention of
§ 1415(e)(3). Id. at 1239-41.
See S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1030
(1981) (termination of educational services, occasioned by an expulsion, is a change in
educational placement that invokes EAHCA's procedural protections); Sherry, 479 F.
Supp. at 1337 (EAHCA's regulations do not permit ignoring the procedural protections
of § 1415 when a temporary, emergency response to a handicapped student's behavior
becomes a change in placement); Kaelin, 682 F.2d at 601 (expulsion from school is a
change in placement under EAHCA).
One must determine what action constitutes a change in placement because notice is
required upon such change. Sherry, 479 F. Supp. at 1337. See Concerned Parents &
Citizens v. Board of Educ., 629 F.2d 751, 755 (2d Cir. 1980) (requiring notice for minor
changes would prove too cumbersome). Tilton, By Richards v. Jefferson County Bd. of
Educ., 705 F.2d 800 (6th Cir. 1983) (minor discretionary changes or transfers to differ-
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process hearing to determine whether misconduct has occurred and
whether the misconduct was the result of the handicap. 5
Courts note that because Congress specifically included emotionally
disturbed children within EAHCA's definition of handicapped chil-
dren,56 it must have intended to protect handicap-related misbehav-
ior.57 When a handicapped child is involved, schools may not attempt
expulsion until a specialized team determines the appropriateness of
the child's placement under EAHCA guidelines.5 8 While courts are
aware of school officials' need to retain authority and discretion, they
will not allow schools to hinder a disruptive handicapped child's access
to education. 9
In Honig v. Doe and Smith,60 the Supreme Court held that neither
state nor local school authorities could unilaterally exclude disabled
children from the classroom for dangerous or disruptive conduct at-
tributable to their handicap.61 The plaintiff, California's Superinten-
ent geographic area with basically the same program does not constitute change in
placement).
55. L. RoTHSEIN, supra note 13, at 60-61.
56. See, e.g., Doe. v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470, 1481 (1986); see supra note 23 for a
definition of handicapped children.
57. 793 F.2d at 1480. The Court found that one method Congress employed to
attack exclusionary practices was to include within the definition of "handicapped"
those children with serious emotional disturbances. Id.
58. See Doe v. Koger, 480 F. Supp. 225, 229 (N.D. Ind. 1979). EAHCA requires
schools to consider whether the child's handicap caused his propensity to disrupt, and
the school must follow the procedures best suited to protect a handicapped child's rights
under EAHCA. Id.
59. Turlington, 635 F.2d at 348. In Turlington, the court observed that "nothing in
the [EAHCA], the regulations, or the legislative history suggests that Congress intended
to remove from local school boards - who alone are accountable to the entire school
community - their long-recognized authority and responsibility to ensure a safe school
environment." Id. at 348 n.9. See, eg., Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Conn.
1978) (the parameters of a decision must be clear because school officials need to be
vested with ample authority and discretion). Jackson v. Franklin County School 3d.,
765 F.2d 535, 538 (5th Cir. 1985) (public schools unquestionably retain their authority
to remove any student, handicapped or otherwise, who disrupts the educational process
or poses a threat to a safe environment). Victoria L. v. District School Bd. of Lee
County, Fla., 741 F.2d 369, 374 (1lth Cir. 1984) (even those cases interpreting the
Rehabilitation Act as expanding handicapped children's rights beyond those specifically
granted by EAHCA have held that Congress did not intend to deprive local school
boards of their traditional authority and responsibility to provide a safe school environ-
ment). See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of procedural
safeguards.
60. 108 S. Ct. 592 (1988).
61. Id. at 604. John Doe assaulted another student and kicked out a school win-
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dent of Public Instruction, asked the Court to read a "dangerousness"
exception into the "stay put" provision that would allow school offi-
cials to exclude dangerous and disruptive students from the classroom
pending completion of review proceedings. 62 The Court nullified the
request, stressing Congress' intent to strip school officials of their for-
mer right to "self-help." '63  The Court further stated that section
1415(e)(3) creates a presumption in favor of the child's current educa-
tion placement which school officials can overcome only by showing
that the current placement is substantially likely to result in injury
dow. His school subsequently suspended him for five days. Thereafter, the school rec-
ommended his expulsion and notified Doe's mother on the last day of his suspension
that the suspension would extend until the school district's placement committee com-
pleted his expulsion proceedings. Doe brought suit against local school officials and the
state superintendent of public education seeking a temporary restraining order cancel-
ling the proceedings. Id. at 594.
Jack Smith, an emotionally disturbed child who experienced academic and social dif-
ficulties, received a five-day suspension for stealing, extorting money from fellow stu-
dents, and making sexual comments to female classmates. The principal recommended
exclusion from the school district and extended Smith's suspension indefinitely pending
a final disposition of the matter. Smith returned to his program after his attorney pro-
tested the school's actions and intervened in Doe's action. Id.
The school district had commenced expulsion proceedings pursuant to the California
Education Code, which permitted indefinite suspensions during the pendency of the
hearing. Id. The district judge issued a preliminary injunction ordering the school to
return Doe to his then current educational placement pending completion of the IEP
review process. Doe returned to school 24 school days after his initial suspension. The
district court entered summary judgment in favor of the students, finding the proposed
expulsions and indefinite suspensions for conduct attributable to the students' handicap
in violation of EAHCA's mandate for a free appropriate public education. Id. at 599.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the orders with slight modifications, holding that an in-
definite suspension constituted a change in placement and that § 1415(e)(3), the "stay
put" provision, did not have a dangerousness exception. Doe v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470
(9th Cir. 1986). EAHCA therefore rendered invalid those sections of the California
Education Code permitting indefinite suspensions or expulsions of handicapped stu-
dents. The court found suspensions of up to 30 days were valid.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit except for the 30-day suspension rul-
ing. The Court held that school officials may temporarily suspend a handicapped child
for up to 10 school days. Honig, 108 S. Ct. at 592. The Court stated that while Con-
gress did not leave school administrators powerless, it did deny them their former right
to "self help." Id. at 604. The Court, in declining to rewrite the statute, rejected the
argument that Congress thought the residual authority of school officials to exclude
dangerous students too obvious to include in the statute. Id at 605.
62. Id. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3) (1976) clearly directs schools to keep a handicapped
child in his current educational placement. The Court found that Congress directed
schools to remove handicapped children only with the permission of the parents, or as a
last resort, the permission of the courts. Honig, 108 S. Ct. at 604.
63. Id.
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either to the handicapped child or others."4 The Supreme Court bal-
anced the students' interest in receiving a FAPE against the state and
local school officials' interest in maintaining a safe learning environ-
ment.65 The Court gave great weight to EAHCA's legislative history
and found the direct omission of a "dangerousness" exception to be
intentional.66
Courts have found that expulsions and indefinite suspensions consti-
tute a change in a child's placement.67 In Stuart v. Nappi,68 the United
States District Court for the District of Connecticut found that expul-
sion would allow schools to circumvent the least restrictive environ-
ment (LRE) requirement.69 Subsequent decisions have exhibited
similar reasoning. For example, in S-1 v. Turlington70 the Fifth Circuit
held that termination of educational services, occasioned by an expul-
sion, is a change in placement in violation of EAHCA.7 1 In Sherry v.
New York State Education Department,72 the United States District
64. Id. at 606. If a child poses an immediate threat to other students or teachers,
school officials may suspend him for up to 10 school days. This authority ensures
others' safety and provides a cooling down period during which officials can initiate IEP
review and seek to persuade the parents to an interim placement. Id. at 605.
65. Id.
66. Id. The Court carefully examined the two landmark decisions that guided Con-
gress in drafting EAHCA, Mills and PARC. Although the injunction issued in PARC
permitted school officials unilaterally to remove students in extraordinary circum-
stances, no such exception existed in Mills. The Court concluded that it could not
create a statutory exception in place of Congress. Id.
67. See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
68. 443 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Conn. 1978).
69. Id. at 1242. In Stuart, a high school student with serious academic and emo-
tional disabilities sought to enjoin an expulsion hearing. The court found that the
school had denied her the right to an appropriate public education and held that such a
denial created a very real possibility of irreparable injury. The court further held that
EAHCA's procedures had replaced expulsion as a means of removing handicapped chil-
dren from school if they became disruptive. Id. at 1240-42. The court's concern is
justified since an expulsion has the effect of changing a child's placement and also re-
stricting the availability of alternative placements. Id. at 1242.
70. 635 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1030 (1981).
71. Id. at 348. The court found that an expulsion denied nine mentally retarded
students their rights under EAHCA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The students
never received hearings to determine whether their misconduct constituted a manifesta-
tion of their handicap.
72. 479 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D.N.Y. 1979). The court enjoined the indefinite suspen-
sion of a self-abusive child, finding the suspension and alternative placement a signifi-
cant change within the meaning of § 1415. Although EAHCA's regulations allow the
use of normal state procedures where a child is a danger to herself, they do not permit
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Court for the Western District of New York similarly concluded that
school officials could not ignore EAHCA's procedural protections
when they suspended indefinitely a handicapped student.7 3 In Doe v.
Koger,7 4 the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Indiana held that EAHCA required schools to place appropriately stu-
dents whose handicaps caused their disruptiveness." Instead of expel-
ling a handicapped student, schools may change the student's
placement from "regular/normal" to "restrictive/special" by modify-
ing the IEP.76
Courts have approved temporary disciplinary measures. In Board of
Education of the City of Peoria v. Illinois State Board of Education,"7
the court held that a brief, temporary suspension did not constitute a
termination of special education.78 In Peoria the school intended the
suspension to teach the student a lesson and to avoid repeat offenses. 9
school officials to ignore the procedural safeguards of § 1415 when the temporary,
emergency response becomes a change in placement. Id at 1337.
73. Id. The school claimed that it had the right to suspend plaintiff on an emer-
gency basis because she presented a danger to herself. The court, however, found that
the suspension had become one of indefinite duration and therefore constituted a signifi-
cant change in placement. Id. at 1335-37. While the court did not question the school's
motivation in protecting the plaintiff's safety, it held that the school's compliance could
have alleviated or eliminated the danger by providing adequate supervision as part of
her educational program. Id at 1339.
74. 480 F. Supp. 225 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
75. Id. at 229. The court found that EAHCA's purpose is to provide handicapped
children with placements that will guarantee their education despite their handicap. It
is not EAHCA's purpose, however, to provide placement which will guarantee an edu-
cation despite a child's will to cause trouble. .d. See Doe v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470,
1481 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Honig v. Doe & Smith, 108 S. Ct. 592 (1988)
(EAHCA prohibits expulsion of a handicapped student for misbehavior that is manifes-
tation of his handicap, and one may infer this proscription from EAHCA's history,
purpose, terms, and accompanying regulation); Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235 (D.
Conn. 1978); Kaelin v. Grubbs, 682 F.2d 595, 602 (6th Cir. 982); S-1 v. Turlington, 635
F.2d 342, 348 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1030 (1981); Doe v. Koger, 480 F.
Supp. 225, 228 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
76. Turnbull, supra note 37, at 195.
77. 531 F. Supp. 148 (C.D. Ill. 1982).
78. Id. at 150. The court stated that the five-day suspension constituted a discipli-
nary interruption from school.
79. Id. The school suspended the 17-year-old learning-disabled student for gross
misconduct and verbal abuse of his teacher. The court stated that no social or other
value existed in finding the student's outburst due to inadequate placement or the fault
of someone other than the offending student. The student "desperately needed to be
brought up short for saying what he did to his teacher." Id.
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The court noted that the disciplinary and educational value of suspen-
sions outweighed the harm of a brief interruption from school.8" The
court found a short absence is not a change in placement or a termina-
tion of educational services.81 Peoria illustrates the belief that handi-
capped children will benefit more from learning in regular classrooms,
even subject to short-term suspensions, than in more restrictive envi-
ronments.82 This position is supported in Honig, where the Supreme
Court held that EAHCA's regulations allow schools to use their nor-
mal procedures so long as they do not result in a change in a handi-
capped child's placement. Thus, the Court allowed temporary
suspensions up to ten school days and interim placements for disabled
children who pose an immediate threat to other students' safety.83 A
temporary emergency response to a handicapped child's behavior be-
comes a change in placement only when schools ignore EAHCA's pro-
cedural safeguards.8 4
V. OPPONENTS OF SUSPENSION AND EXPULSION
Handicapped children and their parents oppose suspension and ex-
pulsion because of the resulting loss of education and socialization. As
the Supreme Court has stated, the loss of more than ten school days is
a significant deprivation which necessitates procedural due process
protections.85 A long-term suspension usually results in either a denial
80. Id The court noted that "[a]ny theory that some harm of the brief interruption
of classroom work could outweigh the educational value of the suspension here can only
be recognized as pure imagination, or a feeble attempt at rationalization of a precon-
ceived notion that handicapped students, whatever the degree of handicap, are free of
classroom discipline." Id.
81. Id at 151.
82. Comment, supra note 6, at 387.
83. Honig v. Doe & Smith, 108 S. Ct. 592, 605 (1988).
84. Id. at 613. See Kenny, Education of All the Handicapped, 12 URn. LAW. 505,
507 (1980). EAHCA does not prohibit all expulsions of handicapped children. See
Note, Enforcing the Right to an "Appropriate" Education, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1103,
1122-23 (1979). Decisionmakers must carefully distinguish between disruptive behavior
by a handicapped child and disruption resulting from the reactions of other children in
the presence of handicapped children who may react out of discomfort or prejudice. Id.
85. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975). The Court stated that education is a
property right protected by the due process clause, which prohibits expulsions because
of misconduct without adherence to minimal due process procedures. Sustaining re-
corded suspension or expulsion charges could seriously damage the student's standing
with his classmates and teachers, in addition to interfering with later opportunities for
higher education and employment. Thus, schools must notify a student facing removal
of the charges against him and afford him a hearing. Id.
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of educational services or the placement of disabled students in home-
based programs that are inadequate to meet their special needs.8 6 Ex-
pulsions and indefinite suspensions similarly confine handicapped chil-
dren to home-based services.87 Opponents of expulsions and long-term
suspensions argue that the exclusion of disabled children from school
directly contravenes EAHCA's protection of the child's right to an ed-
ucation in the least restrictive environment.
In Stuart v. Nappi,ss the court held that an expelled student would
suffer inherent injury by the denial of an educational program.89 In
Stuart the plaintiff proved that the denial of any educational program
from the time of her expulsion until the development of a new IEP
would cause irreparable injuries.' ° The expulsion, the court believed,
would preclude the child from taking part in special education pro-
grams offered by her school, thus hindering her social development. 91
The court found that the student's restriction to homebound tutoring
would merely perpetuate her social disability. 92
In Hairston v. Drosick,93 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of West Virginia found that the exclusion of handi-
capped children who could function in a regular classroom was a great
disservice. 94 The court stated that a major goal of an educational pro-
gram is the regular classroom socialization process that allows handi-
capped children to interact with their peers. 95 The court found it
imperative that every handicapped child receive an education that pro-
vided him the maximum benefit of placement with his peers.96
86. Sindelar, supra note 47, at 1.
87. Id. at 6.
88. 443 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Conn. 1979).
89. Id. at 1240.
90. Id. The court was concerned that some time may pass before the child would
resume the special education to which she was entitled. Id.
91. Id
92. Id. If the child suffered expulsion, private school or homebound tutoring would
represent her only placement possibilities. However, there was the possibility that ap-
propriate private placement would not be available.
93. 423 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. W. Va. 1976).
94. Id at 183. The court stated that a child's chance in society lies in the educa-
tional process. See supra notes 27-29.
95. 423 F. Supp. at 183.
96. Id. Expert testimony established that placement of children in abnormal situa-
tions without their peers causes additional psychological and emotional problems that,
combined with their existing handicaps, cause them greater difficulties later in life.
1989]
Washington University Open Scholarship
156 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 36:137
Opponents of suspension and expulsion also argue that excluding a
handicapped child from an educational program is stigmatizing.97 Ex-
clusion, opponents contend, thwarts further intellectual development"
and may cause permanent psychological and emotional damage.99
Predictably, excluded handicapped children exhibit a lower level of
achievement. Courts agree that exclusion from school greatly harms
the handicapped child 1"° and that school officials must make efforts to
accommodate the special needs of a handicapped child within a regular
classroom. 1o
VI. ADVOCATES OF SUSPENSION AND EXPULSION
Many school officials argue that suspension and expulsion are neces-
sary to discipline misbehaving disabled children." °2 They contend that
there should not be a double standard for student conduct - handi-
capped students should not be allowed to commit disruptive acts with
impunity while nonhandicapped students are punished for the same
acts."0 3 The dual disciplinary system, school officials argue, ultimately
harms handicapped children 1" by leading them to believe their inap-
propriate behavior is excused by their emotional problems. °5 There-
fore, school officials argue that handicapped children receive a false
impression of society's expectations of them.' 6
97. Note, Legal Remedies for the Misclassification or Wrongful Placement of Educa-
tionally Handicapped Children, 14 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 389, 425 (1979).
98. Id. at 426.
99. Id.
100. See also S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U. S.
1030 (1981) (expulsions deny education to those entitled under EAHCA).
101. Note, Enforcing the Right to an "Appropriate Education", 92 HARV. L. REV.
1103, 1122 (1979).
102. Disciplinarians must provide a safe environment conducive to all students'
learning. They consider suspensions not only a necessary tool to maintain order, but
also a valuable educational device. School officials use suspensions to deal with frequent
occurrences or those requiring immediate, effective action. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565, 580 (1975).
103. Kaelin v. Grubbs, 682 F.2d 595, 601 (6th Cir. 1982). The Kaelin court dis-
agreed with this contention and adopted the Turlington court's finding that handi-
capped children are not totally immunized from disciplinary action and can generally
receive discipline in the same manner as their nonhandicapped peers.
104. See Appellants' Opening Brief, in 3 E.H.L.R. 551:360 (1979-80).
105. Id. at 551:361-62.
106. Id. at 551:362. Opponents of expulsion concede a dual system, but argue that
the potential benefits of remaining in school justify differential treatment. They claim
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Although courts permit schools temporarily to suspend disruptive
handicapped students, many school officials still feel stripped of discre-
tion and authority. School officials argue that invoking EAHCA's pro-
cedural safeguards for expulsions and not suspensions creates an
artificial distinction.1"7 In Kaelin v. Grubbs,10 8 the Sixth Circuit re-
jected this argument, identifying two important policy reasons to jus-
tify the application of EAHCA's procedural protections to expulsions
and not temporary suspensions."°9 First, the court noted that school
officials still retain authority to control a handicapped child's violent or
antisocial behavior.110 Thus, schools may suspend a student temporar-
ily by adhering to the proper procedures. 11 Second, the court felt that
the school's use of traditional expulsion procedures would eviscerate
the crucial IEP concept.' 12
School officials also argue that unless the child is classified as emo-
tionally disturbed, there is no relationship between the handicap and
the behavior. 113 Thus, a child's physical or mental impairment should
not shield him from discipline administered to nonhandicapped chil-
dren.' 14 Such generalizations, however, are contrary to Congress' em-
nonhandicapped children are less likely to suffer adverse effects when expelled. See
Schoof, supra note 51, at 698.
107. Kaelin v. Grubbs, 682 F.2d 595, 602 (6th Cir. 1982).
108. 682 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1982).
109. Id. at 602. The court stated that following the procedures of 20 U.S.C. § 1415
(1976) preserves the individualized education planning for the handicapped child. 682
F.2d at 602.
110. Id.
11. Id. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), enumerated the procedural protections
required for suspended students. The Court held, "[D]ue Process requires, in connec-
tion with a suspension of ten days or less, that the student be given oral or written
notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence
the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the story." Id. at 581.
Notice and hearing should precede the student's removal. Id. at 581-82.
112. Kaelin, 682 F.2d at 602.
113. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1030 (1981). The school agreed that a handicapped child should not be expelled for
misconduct related to the handicap itself. However, they sought to limit application of
this principle to students classified as "seriously emotionally disturbed." Id.
See, e.g., Doe v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470, 1481 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Honig v.
Doe & Smith, 108 S. Ct. 592 (1988) (disruptive behavior is not a monopoly of the
emotionally disturbed); Sherry v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 479 F. Supp. 1328
(W.D.N.Y. 1979).
114. Comment, supra note 6, at 383. Educators believe that they must treat an
emotionally disturbed child differently from students whose behavioral problems are
not based on emotional difficulties. While they feel that students with physical impair-
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phasis on individual evaluation and programming.' 5 Furthermore,
EAHCA does not allow schools to differentiate handicaps." 6 Once a
child is classified as handicapped and requires special education, he is
entitled to all EAHCA procedural protections before a change in his
program can occur. 117 School officials argue that these protections ef-
fectively preclude them from using expulsion and suspension as disci-
plinary tools.' 18
Another EAHCA regulation states that separation and removal
from regular education may occur only when the handicap is severe
enough to make regular education impractical.19 The section's com-
ment states that the school cannot meet the handicapped child's needs
in a regular classroom when his disruptive behavior sufficiently impairs
the education of others.120 Consequently, schools argue that the inap-
propriateness of regular placement and the protection of the safety of
others justifies the removal of a dangerous disabled child. 12 1
Proponents of expulsion and suspension also argue that school sys-
tems lack the resources to serve highly disruptive or dangerous stu-
dents.122 The Mills123 court, however, held schools accountable to
ments should not escape the consequences of their unacceptable behavior, a student
who does not have emotional handicaps should have normal behavior capability.
A psychologist's testimony at the preliminary injunction hearing, however, suggests
that a connection between the misconduct and the children's handicap may have ex-
isted. A child with low intellectual functions and little control would respond to stress
with abusive or aggressive behavior as a way of dealing with threats and feelings of
vulnerability. Turlington, 635 F.2d at 347.
115. Id. at 346.
116. Comment, supra note 6, at 384.
117. Id.
118. See Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235, 1243 (D. Conn. 1978); S-1 v.
Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1030 (1981).
119. 34 C.F.R. 300 (1987).
120. Id. See also Schoof, supra note 51, at 699.
121. See, e.g., Jackson v. Franklin County School Bd., 765 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1985)
(public schools unquestionably retain their authority to remove any student who dis-
rupts the educational process or poses a threat to a safe environment); Victoria L. v.
District School Bd. of Lee County, Fla., 741 F.2d 369 (1 lth Cir. 1984) (school properly
exercised traditional disciplinary authority); S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342 (5th Cir.
1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1030 (1981) (expulsion still proper disciplinary tool if used
under proper circumstances).
122. Sindelar, supra note 47, at 3.
123. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) (one of the cases providing the impetus for
EAHCA). See supra notes 18, 44.
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handicapped students despite a lack of funds.124 The court found edu-
cating handicapped children to be more important than preserving a
school's financial resources 125 and that schools have a duty to provide
a comprehensive program to handicapped children regardless of
cost. 126
Schools also point out the difficulty of determining whether behavior
is handicap-related.127 They contend that because the child's problems
are emotional, social, and medical, rather than educational, other state
agencies should provide treatment. 121 Usually, a child's educational,
social, medical, and emotional needs are so intimately intertwined,
however, that it is not realistic to separate them.
129
A comment to one of EAHCA's regulations addresses the conflict
between the "stay put" provision and school's disciplinary proce-
dures.13 School officials rely on this comment, which states that while
124. Id. at 876.
125. Id. The Mills court stated that if
sufficient funds are not available to finance all of the services and programs that are
needed and desirable in the system then the available funds must be expended equi-
tably in such a manner that no child is entirely excluded from a publicly supported
education consistent with his needs and ability to benefit therefrom. The inadequa-
cies of the system must not bear more heavily on the "exceptional" or handicapped
child than on the normal child.
Id.
126. Kenny, Education ofAll the Handicapped, 12 URB. LAW. 505, 508 (1980). See
Sherry v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 479 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D.N.Y. 1979). In Sherry,
the plaintiff was a blind, deaf, and emotionally disturbed girl who required one-to-one
supervision because of self-abusive behavior. The court held that EAHCA's regulations
properly mandate that regardless of the severity of the handicap, the school must pro-
vide an appropriate education which must encompass, as a related aid and service, suffi-
cient supervisory staff to meet the child's needs. Id at 1339.
127. Doe v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470, 1482-83 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Honig v.
Doe & Smith, 108 S. Ct. 592 (1988). The court, recognizing the difficulty in distinguish-
ing between the two types of behavior, stated that by receiving federal funds a state
assumes the burden. Id
128. North v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 471 F. Supp. 136, 140 (D.D.C.
1979). The school believed parents should provide appropriate living arrangements,
and if unable or unwilling to do so, the responsibility shifted to social services agencies,
not the Board of Education. The school suggested that the child look toward alternate
commitment schemes such as those enumerated in the D.C. Code relating to delinquent
or neglected children, or for those in need of supervision. The court held that the edu-
cational authorities have the clear duty to place the child in a residential facility if
necessary to provide an appropriate educational program. Id.
129. Id. The court noted the impossibility of performing the Solomon-like task of
separating the child's needs. Id.
130. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3) (1976); 34 C.F.R. § 300.513 (1987).
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school's cannot change a child's placement during a complaint pro-
ceeding, they may use their normal procedures concerning children
who endanger themselves or others. 3 ' Because schools' regular emer-
gency procedures often include suspensions or expulsions, school offi-
cials suggest that EAHCA permits them to discipline a dangerous
handicapped student.' 32 Thus, school officials suggest that section
1415(e)(3) permits suspensions and expulsions in emergencies.' 33
Although EAHCA seeks to maintain a child's current educational
placement, schools desire discretionary authority to change a handi-
capped student's placement when he endangers himself or others or
threatens to disrupt a safe school environment.'3 4 In Victoria L. by
Carol A. v. District School Board,13 the Eleventh Circuit held that a
student whose behavior had proved both unacceptable and dangerous
had no absolute right to remain in high school pending an appeal of his
131. 34 C.F.R. § 300.513 comment (1987).
132. See, eg., Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235, 1242 (D. Conn. 1978) (comment
to § 1415(e)(3) suggests that the subsection prohibits disciplinary measures which effec-
tively change a child's placement while permitting the type of procedures necessary for
dealing with a student who appears dangerous); Sherry v. New York State Educ. Dep't,
479 F. Supp. 1328, 1336 (W.D.N.Y. 1979) (defendants argued the validity of sus-
pending the child because suspension was the school's normal procedure for contending
with a self-endangering child).
Courts have accepted this reasoning for temporary suspensions that do not constitute
changes in placement. However, courts have relied on 34 C.F.R. § 300.552 comment
(1987), which notes the inappropriateness of regular placement for a child who is so
disruptive that he impairs the education of others and who has needs that cannot be met
in that environment. The comment states that it sought to clarify that schools are per-
mitted to use their regular procedures for dealing with emergencies. The appropriate
response to a child's dangerous behavior, however, is to place him in a more restrictive
environment rather than long-term suspension or expulsion. The Stuart court held sus-
pensions up to 10 school days adequate for addressing emergency situations. 443 F.
Supp. at 1243.
133. The comment to 34 C.F.R. § 300.513 (1987) states that schools may use their
regular procedures for dealing with emergencies. Some commenters wanted a provision
allowing change of placement for health and safety reasons, while others requested that
the regulations not consider suspension a change in placement. HHS responded that
§ 1415(e)(3) would not prevent a public agency from using its regular procedures for
dealing with emergencies. Stuart, 443 F. Supp. at 1242 n.5.
134. Jackson v. Franklin County School Bd., 765 F.2d 535, 538 (5th Cir. 1985).
Courts have held that § 1415(e)(3) does not prohibit a court from modifying a handi-
capped child's placement during an IEP appeal. Id. See also S-1 v. Turlington, 635
F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1030 (1981) (local school board retains
authority to remove handicapped child upon a proper finding that he is endangering
himself or others).
135. 741 F.2d 369 (11th Cir. 1984).
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placement.136 In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that Con-
gress did not intend to deprive local school boards of their traditional
authority to ensure a safe school environment.137 Schools argue that
such dangerous behavior justifies indefinite suspensions without resort
to EAHCA's complex procedures.
138
Courts have found, however, that expulsion and suspension are
proper disciplinary tools under EAHCA when schools follow proper
procedures.' 39 Before an expulsion can occur, a qualified group of in-
dividuals must evaluate alternative placements and the child's individ-
ual needs."4 Expulsion is allowed if this group determines that the
handicap and the misconduct are unrelated. 4'
Courts have struck a delicate balance between the special educa-
tional needs of handicapped children and school officials' need to disci-
pline disruptive students. However, courts will not allow schools to
terminate educational services completely during an expulsion pe-
riod.' 42 Schools may not subject handicapped children to a total cessa-
tion of educational services, even if their disruptive behavior is not
handicap related. Thus, schools must adhere to the EAHCA's "stay
put" provision, which requires that handicapped children remain in
their current placements pending resolution of review proceedings.
136. Id. at 371. The school transferred a child with a special learning disability
from her high school to a statutorily designated school for disruptive and disinterested
students. Id. In addition to skipping classes and smoking, the child brought a razor
blade and martial arts weapons to school and threatened to injure or kill another stu-
dent. Id. at 371 n.l.
137. Id. at 374. The evidence proved that the student's behavior at the high school
posed a threat to both students and school officials. The court held that the school had
properly exercised the traditional disciplinary authority retained under EAHCA. Id.
138. See Schoof, supra note 51, at 699.
139. Id. at 700. See Honig v. Doe & Smith, 108 S. Ct. 592 (1988); Stuart v. Nappi,
443 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Conn. 1978); S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1030 (1981); Doe v. Koger, 480 F. Supp. 225 (N.D. Ind. 1979);
Sherry v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 479 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D.N.Y. 1979).
140. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d) (1976). 34 C.F.R. § 300.533(a)(3) (1987) requires that
specialized persons-those knowledgeable about the child, the meaning of evaluation
data, and placement options-make placement decisions.
141. See supra notes 55, 84 and accompanying text for a discussion of handicapped-
related and handicapped-unrelated misconduct.
142. Turlington, 635 F.2d at 348. See infra notes 77-84 for discussion of temporary
suspensions.
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VII. ALTERNATIVES
Handicapped children are not immune from all discipline. If the
handicap is related to the disturbance, however, removal of the child
from the educational system is inappropriate."4 3 Expulsion is available
to the school once it approves the handicapped child's placement and
determines that his misbehavior did not result from the handicap. 144 If
discipline problems are anticipated at the IEP stage, the IEP should
include an appropriate disciplinary measure. 145 Rather than expelling
a handicapped child, the school may transfer the student to an appro-
priate, more restrictive environment or utilize other measures. 1
4 6
The Doe and Stuart courts indicate that appropriate placement
would minimize a student's disruptive behavior.147 Thus, when a dis-
abled student is disruptive, school officials must reevaluate his place-
ment. In doing so, schools may transfer students between classes or
schools in the hope that a new environment will prompt more accepta-
ble behavior.'4 8 Such transfers do not require a "change of placement"
hearing because they allow students to receive similar instruction in a
program with the same degree of restrictiveness. 149 Schools may also
subject less disruptive handicapped students to disciplinary methods
such as detention, restriction of privileges or extracurricular activities,
isolated study carrels, or time away from the classroom without perma-
nently removing them from a regular classroom or changing the
IEP. 150 These measures are part of the normal procedures that
143. See supra notes 87-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of mainstream-
ing and the harm of expulsions.
144. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the use of
expulsion.
145. L. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 13, at 62.
146. Honig, 108 S. Ct. at 618. See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the least restrictive environment principle.
147. Doe v. Koger, 480 F. Supp. 225 (N.D. Ind. 1979); Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F.
Supp. 1235 (D. Conn. 1978).
148. Comment, supra note 6, at 385. Schools may transfer students for administra-
tive reasons, such as moving mobility-impaired students to a new, more accessible build-
ing. Such transfers do not constitute a change in placement if the child would receive
similar instruction in a program neither more nor less restrictive than the one he or she
left.
See Doe v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470, 1487 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Honig v. Doe
& Smith, 108 S. Ct. 592 (1988) (all minor changes in program or services are not
changes in placement unless significant).
149. Id.
150. Honig, 108 S. Ct. at 618.
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EAHCA's regulations suggest.
School officials may freely employ reasonable disciplinary measures
that neither deprive a student of an appropriate public education nor
change his placement.15' The Doe court found that two- and five-day
suspensions met both these criteria.'52 The court stated that EAHCA
does not provide any bright-line criteria for determining when a disci-
plinary measure becomes a change in placement; thus, schools may ex-
ercise sound disciplinary judgment.' 53 A short, fixed, temporary
suspension gives school officials time to develop strategies for coping
with the child during the pendency of an ensuing review proceeding
and to persuade the child's parents to agree to an interim placement.'54
Furthermore, suspensions of less than ten days do not rise to the level
of changes in placement within the meaning of EAHCA.'55 Fixed-
term suspensions set deadlines for returning disruptive handicapped
students to school, thereby creating an incentive for resolving dis-
putes. 156 School officials may abuse this practice by invoking a string
of "interim suspensions" to forestall a student's right to a formal hear-
ing, to avoid the legal repercussions of long-term suspensions, and to
exclude the handicapped child from school."' Frequent short-term
suspensions, however, constitute a constructive change in placement
and an exclusion or denial of benefits.' 58
Although school officials contend that they are now helpless in disci-
plining handicapped students, they can make program changes that do
not constitute a change in placement. Moreover, school officials may
seek judicial relief if existing procedures prove inadequate to cope with
dangerous circumstances and the parents refuse to a change in place-
ment. 59 Schools must complete all administrative proceedings before
151. 793 F.2d at 1484.
152. Id. The court held that such suspensions did not exhaust all permissible types
of disciplinary measures. Informal, reasonable, and less substantial disciplinary meas-
ures that school officials have traditionally used to maintain order are similarly inoffen-
sive under EAHCA. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1485.
155. Honig, 108 S. Ct. at 605.
156. 793 F.2d at 1486.
157. Comment, supra note 6, at 382. See also Sindelar, supra note 47, at 7.
158. Id. See Sherry v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 479 F. Supp. 1328, 1337
(W.D.N.Y. 1979) (indefinitely suspending brain-damaged and self-abusive child signifi-
cantly changed her situation, thereby changing her placement).
159. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1976) gives school officials an opportunity to invoke
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seeking judicial review. The only way to bypass the administrative
process is to demonstrate its futility or inadequacy.160 Section
1415(e)(3) does not limit the courts' equitable powers temporarily to
enjoin a dangerous handicapped child from attending school.' 6' While
courts recognize the need for IEP flexibility, they know that flexibility
cannot become a tool for avoiding EAHCA's protection. Courts
should prohibit informal expulsions such as indefinite suspensions,'62
since such devices allow a school to circumvent the handicapped
child's rights to an education in the LRE and exclude the child from a
placement that is appropriate for his academic and social
development.16
3
A change in placement is an appropriate long-term method schools
may adopt to handle handicapped children with severe disciplinary
problems. 1" As the Ninth Circuit noted, it is difficult to distinguish
between residual disciplinary authority and a change in placement.'65
A difference exists, however, between a provision authorizing a fixed-
term suspension and one that authorizes school officials to suspend a
student's education indefinitely. 1 66 School officials must weigh the dis-
ciplinary justification of exclusion' 67 against the psychological detri-
ment of segregation.' 68
judicial aid. Any party aggrieved by the findings and decisions made under subsection
(b) shall have the right to bring a civil action. Plaintiffs may sue in any state or district
court without regard to the amount in controversy. Id.
160. Honig, 108 S. Ct. at 606.
161. Id.
162. Doe v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470, 1491 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Honig v.
Doe & Smith, 108 S. Ct. 592 (1988). For EAHCA's purposes, an indefinite suspension
is the same as an expulsion. Comment, supra note 6, at 386. See also Doe v. Koger, 480
F. Supp. 225, 228-29 (N.D. Ind. 1979). EAHCA limits schools' suspension of a handi-
capped child to the time it takes to place him in the appropriate, more restrictive
environment.
163. Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235, 1243 (D. Conn. 1978). The result of exclu-
sion from the regular classroom "flies in the face if the explicit mandate of [EAHCA,]
which requires that all placement decisions be made in conformity with a child's right
to an education in the [LRE]." Id.
164. See supra notes 93-95, 146-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of trans-
ferring handicapped children.
165. 793 F.2d at 1486.
166. Id Congress did not intend school officials to avoid EAHCA's "stay put"
provision by unilaterally determining that a child should be suspended indefinitely be-
cause he is dangerous. Id.
167. See supra notes 102-12, 134-38 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 85-100 and accompanying text.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
EAHCA's procedural safeguards are not blindly protectionist, nor
do they require schools to tolerate behavior in disabled students that
they would not tolerate from nonhandicapped students. 169  The
Supreme Court, while cognizant of school officials' need for authority
and discretion, has merely limited that authority. 7 ° Disabled children
are neither immune from a school's disciplinary process nor entitled to
participate in programs when their behavior impairs the education and
safety of others.
Limiting school officials' disciplinary authority will result in less dis-
crimination against the handicapped. Although schools believe
EAHCA deprives them of their traditional disciplinary authority, al-
ternatives do exist. EAHCA affords schools both short-term and long-
term methods for dealing with disruptive handicapped children.
School officials can take swift disciplinary measures such as suspen-
sions of up to ten school days. They can also request a change in place-
ment for handicapped students who, by disrupting the education of
other children in the class, have demonstrated that their current place-
ment is inappropriate. Therefore, school officials' limited disciplinary
authority is in the disabled child's best interest and ensures that he
receives an appropriate education.
Caryn Gelbman*
169. Comment, supra note 6, at 379.
170. Honig v. Doe & Smith, 108 S. Ct. 592 (1988).
* J.D. 1989, Washington University.
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